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INTRODUCTION 
The plaintiff's brief in this matter contains the 
assertion that the issues properly presented on appeal are 
somehow constrained by terms of the findings and conclusions 
entered by the court below. Obviously, this is not the law or 
the commission of error in entering findings and conclusions would 
never be reviewable. Indeed, not only 4re these acts of trial 
courts subject to review but, as has been previously noted by this 
Court, the conclusions of law entered by a trial court are not 
presumed to be correct and are not entitled to deference on 
appeal. Steele v. Breinholt, P.2d , 73 UAR 8 6 (Utah App. 
1988). Accordingly, this Court should rfeview the conclusions 
of law entered in this action in light of the evidence actually 
received to determine if they are supported by that evidence. 
Furthermore, the trial court's interpretation of a 
written contract is the determination of a question of law which 
need not be deferred to an appeal. Faulkner v. Farnsworth, 714 
P.2d 1149 (Utah 1986). This Court is freet to, and should, interpret 
the written option in issue without reference to the trial court's 
erroneous conclusion concerning that document. 
POINT I - THE PLAINTIFF NEVER ACQUIRED CONTRACTUAL RIGHTS 
CAPABLE OF SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE. 
The plaintiff's attempts to remake history in this action 
by suggesting that this case does not involve an option are 
contrary to all the evidence and its own pleadings. The present 
action was initiated by a complaint which alleged that "[o]n or 
about February 2, 1986, plaintiff and defendants entered into 
an agreement whereby plaintiff obtained an option to purchase 
certain property from defendants." The complaint further alleged 
that "despite plaintiff's substantial performance, [defendants] 
refused to perform pursuant to the option agreement." 
After becoming informed that the law does not recognize 
the doctrine of substantial performance in reference to options, 
the plaintiff then decided the option in question was not a "true" 
option, whatever that means. 
However, the option in question isnft confusing, 
ambiguous or subject to conflicting interpretations. While the 
trial court entered a conclusion of law that the parties had an 
agreement that was "the equivalent of an earnest money receipt 
and offer to purchase which was accepted", this conclusion of 
law, which is entitled to no deference in this Court, is totally 
at odds with the evidence. 
It is significant that plaintiff was unable to cite to 
any testimony or any exhibit which supposedly provides the basis 
in fact for this conclusion of law. The documents signed by 
the defendants expressly refer to an option granted to plaintiff. 
Plaintiff unequivocally admitted he failed to exercise the option. 
While it is undoubtedly true that the trial court 
believed that plaintiff made a stupid mistake through ignorance, 
this fact provides no basis for "reforming" his agreement with 
the defendants into the type of agreement he could have, but did 
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not, make for himself. 
POINT II - A RECOVERY IN QUANTUM MERUIT REQUIRES A FINDING OF 
OF SOME ACT BY THE DEFENDANTS JUSTIFYING RELIEF. 
During the option period plaintiflf agreed with Tracy 
Collins to pay off a note which Tracy Colllins held, which note 
was secured by a deed of trust against the property. Plaintiff 
admits that the defendants did not request that it make this 
payment. However/ plaintiff contends that it was obligated to 
make the payment by virtue of the "agreement" entered into with 
the Roberts. However, the "agreement" referred to is the contract 
which never came into existence because plaintiff failed to 
exercise its option to make that agreement binding upon the 
Roberts. 
While there is no question that the Roberts were 
benefited by this payment/ the mere fact that they were enriched 
does not provide a basis for relief in equity. As the Utah 
Supreme Court noted in Commercial Fixtures & Furnishings/ Inc. v. 
Adams/ 564 P.2d 773 (Utah 1977): 
The mere fact that a third person 
benefits from a contract between 
two others does not make such third 
person liable in quasi-contract, 
unjust enrichment, or restitution. 
There must be some misleading act, 
request for services/ or the tike/ 
to support such an action. 
564 P.2d at 774. See also. Knight v. Post/ P.2d , 74 UAR 
32 (Utah App. 1988). 
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Although the plaintiff conferred a benefit upon defendants 
while undoubtedly laboring under a unilateral mistake regarding 
its legal rights, there was no conduct by the defendants which 
justifies imposing the equitable remedy of restitution. 
POINT III - THIS APPEAL IS NOT MOOT. 
The controversy between the parties in this action has 
not been eliminated. The central controversy involves who is 
rightfully entitled to ownership of the home. The Roberts have 
taken every action possible, short of contempt of Court, to 
preserve this central question for appellate resolution. They 
have filed motions for new trial and for stay of exec ution in 
the trial court; they promptly appealed and moved for stay of 
execution in this court. They sought protection in the Bankruptcy 
Court and they have not accepted any benefit conferred upon them 
by the judgment. All of these actions are entirely inconsistent 
with the notion that they have "agreed" to the judgment entered 
below. 
As has been previously noted, the general rule relating 
to the mootness of an appeal is that 
[w]here a party acts under compulsion 
of and in accordance with a judgment 
order from which an appeal is then 
taken, there has been no waiver of the 
appeal or release of errors, the 
issue is not moot and the party is not 
estopped from prosecuting the appeal. 
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Les Michude & Son Co. v. Metropolitan Sanitary Dist., 97 111. App. 
3d. 340, 422 N.E. 2d 1078 (1981). 
Plaintiff does not point to any purported act of the 
defendants as an expression of an "agreement" with the judgment 
below, but rather asserts only that the failure of parties, 
who are admittedly bankruptcy, to post an $8 5,000 bond should 
preclude consideration of their appeal on t}he merits. Any such 
interpretation of Utah law would be violative of the Utah 
Constitution's Open Courts provision, Art. L §11, and the due 
process and equal protection clauses of thel Fourteenth Amendment 
of the United States Constitution. See, generally, Pennzoil Co. v. 
Texaco, Inc., U.S. ,107 S.Ct. 1519 (19B7). 
As defendants are entitled to a review of their claims 
on the merits, without regard to their impefcuniosity, this Court 
should reject the suggestion of mootness. 
CONCLUSION 
Each of the arguments advanced in $upport of the judgment 
entered below requires a finding of the existence of a bilateral 
contract, which contract never came into being by virtue of the 
failure of the plaintiff to exercise its option. The belief that 
the plaintiff would have exercised its option had it been properly 
cognizant of the law does not provide any lqgal justification for 
plaintiff's failure to do so. Accordingly, the judgment entered 
below should be reversed and this matter remanded with instructions to 
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enter judgment against the plaintiff, no cause of action, 
DATED this day of February, 1988. 
M. David Eckersley 
Attorney for Appellants 
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